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CIVIL PRACTICE ACT CASES
APPEAL AND ERROR-PROCEEDINGS FOR PREPARATION-EFFECT OF FAILuRE
To FILE PRAECIPE WITHIN TIME ALLOWED BY RULE 36.-In the case of Harris
v. Sovereign Camp of Woodmen of the World, Inc.,' the appellant had filed
its praecipe for record eleven days after filing its notice of appeal, and the
appellee, relying on Subdivision 1(a)2 of Rule 36 of the Supreme Court re-
quiring the filing of such praecipe within ten days, moved to dismiss the
appeal. Held: Motion to dismiss denied.
The present problem was foreshadowed in the case of Lanquist v.
Grossman,3 in which appellant, having failed to file his praecipe within
the ten day period, became apprehensive that this omission might be held
fatal to his right of appeal and thereupon filed a second notice of appeal
and praecipe thereunder. In dismissing the second appeal, the Appellate
Court held that there was no provision for a second notice of appeal and
therefore it was a nullity. 4 The court said: "If the appellant had proceed-
ed with his original perfected appeal and filed his record on appeal in this
court within apt time, even though his praecipe for record did not comply
with the rules as to the time of its filing, a different question would have
been presented," but properly left such question unanswered until pre-
sented in the instant case.
While it has generally been held in Illinois that the right to appeal is
purely statutory5 and that the statute must be strictly complied with, the
Appellate Court pointed out that even under the old practice6 the purpose
of filing a praecipe, and notice thereof on the opposite party, was to give
the latter an opportunity to file an additional praecipe for any portions of
the record not ordered up by the appellant; and that the giving of such
notice, where the entire record was included in the appeal, as it was in
the instant case, was not an indispensable prerequisite to the right to have
the record reviewed.
Liberal construction of the provisions of the Civil Practice Act and the
rules enacted pursuant thereto, 7 especially when coupled with the express
language of Section 76 (2)8 thereof, indicates a clear intention on the
part of the legislature that no party should lose his right of appeal merely
through failure to comply strictly with procedural steps established by
rules of court.9  R. F. GOODMANSON
1 302 Ill. App. 310, 23 N.E. (2d) 793 (1939).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, § 259.36. 3 282 Ill. App. 181 (1935).
4 Accord: Cullinan v. Cullinan, 285 Ill. App. 272, 1 N.E. (2d) 921 (1936); Corrigan
v. Vin Schill College of Chiropody and Pedic Surgery, 277 Ill. App. 350 (1934).
5 Hall v. First National Bank of Pittsfield, 330 Ill. 234, 161 N.E. 311 (1928);
Davison v. Heinrich, 340 Ill. 349, 172 N.E. 770 (1930).
6 People v. Union Gas and Electric Co., 258 I1. 193, 101 N.E. 421 (1913).
7 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, § 128.
s Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 120, § 200(2). See 162 East Ohio Street Building Corp.
v. Lindheimer, 368 Ill. 294, 13 N.E. (2d) 970 (1938); Veach v. Hendricks, 278 Ill.
App. 376 (1935).
9 Other instances of liberal construction of provisions affecting appellate pro-
cedure appear in the following cases: City of Chicago v. Peterson, 360 Ill. 177,
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EQUrrY-BILL OF REVIEw-NECESSrrY THAT COMPLAINT SET OUT THE
PLEADINGS IN THE PROCEEDING SOUGHT To BE REVIEWED.-A consent decree
in a foreclosure proceeding was entered, and no appeal was taken. There-
after a complaint in the nature of a bill of review was filed to set aside
the decree on the grounds that "the court did not have jurisdiction to
make any order concerning . . . " certain tracts of land dealt with by
the decree. It was held in Davis v. Oliver,' by the Illinois Appellate Court,
that the complaint was insufficient in that the answer to the original bill
and the answer to the cross-bill, pleadings in the original case, were not
set forth in haec verba. The holding follows a long line of cases 2 preceding
the Civil Practice Act and affirms the former practice requiring that a
bill of review recite all the pleadings and the decree in the proceeding to
be reviewed. W. L. SCHLEGEL
JUDGMENT-PROCEEDINGS TO COMPEL SETOFF--MORTGAGOR'S RIGHT IN FORE-
CLOSURE SUIT To SET up COUNTERCLAIM FOR DAMAGES ARISING FROM MORT-
GAGEE'S WRONGFUL INTERFERENCE wrrH PossEssIoN.-In State Bank of St.
Charles v. Burr,1 the Supreme Court construed Section 382 of the Civil
Practice Act as permitting a mortgagor in a foreclosure proceeding to
set off against the mortgage debt, by way of counterclaim, a claim for
damages resulting from the mortgagee's wrongful interference with his
possession of the mortgaged land. The counterclaim was tried by a jury,
and after a verdict and judgment for the defendant counterclaimant, a
decree of foreclosure was entered for the amount of the mortgage debt
less the amount of the judgment on the counterclaim. On appeal, the de-
fendant objected that the lower court was without jurisdiction to decree
that the judgment on the counterclaim was a proper setoff against the
mortgaged debt; that it amounted to the entry of a personal judgment or
195 N.E. 636 (1935); Conour v. Zimnmerly, 290 Ill. App. 546, 9 N.E. (2d) 61 (1937),
noted in 15 CHICAGo-KENT REvWW 341; National Bank of the Republic v. Kasper
American State Bank, 369 Ill. 34, 15 N.E. (2d) 721 (1938), noted in 17 CHICAGO-
KENT LAw REviEw 74; Schaefer v. Robillard, 370 Ill. 92, 17 N.E. (2d) 963 (1938),
noted in 17 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 175; Melsha v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,
299 IMl. App. 157, 19 N.E. (2d) 753 (1939), noted in 17 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVMW 277.
By way of contrast, see Francke v. Eadie, 301 Ill. App. 254, 22 N.E. (2d) 720
(2d Dist., 1939) noted in 18 CsucACo-KENT LAw REviEw 89. Caution against too
flagrant abuse of the court rules, however, is interposed in the instant case by the
court's warning that "at the same time we do not feel that the implication should
be drawn from this opinion that the filing of the praecipe and the rules [of the
Supreme Court] referred to in this opinion can be disregarded with impunity."
303 IMI. App. 310 at 320, 23 N.E. (2d) 793 at 798.
1 25 N.E. (2d) 905 (Ill. App., 1940).
2 "Regarding the bill then as a mere bill of review, it is clearly insufficient.
The rule in this State is too well settled to admit of discussion, that it is indis-
pensably necessary to the sufficiency of such a bill that a copy of the bill, answer,
replication, and decree in the proceeding sought to be reviewed should be given.
A synopsis of those papers, which is all that appears in the bill in this case, is
not sufficient." Cox v. Lynn, 138 Ill. 195, 29 N.E. 857 (1891). See also Turner v.
Berry, 8 Ill. 541 (1846); Gardner v. Emerson, 40 Ill. 296 (1866); Judson v. Stephens,
75 Ill. 255 (1874); Aholtz v. Durfee, 122 Ill. 286, 13 N.E. 645 (1887).
1 372 IMI. 114, 22 N.E. (2d) 941 (1939).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, § 162.
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decree against the mortgage debtor before the property is sold in viola-
tion of Section 173 of the statute on mortgages. The Supreme Court dis-
missed this objection as being without merit in view of the fact that there
was no unconditional decree issued before sale.
Before the code undoubtedly the defendant's counterclaim would have
failed. The defendant might have recouped damages arising out of the
same transaction on which the plaintiff's action is based, 4 as where the
mortgagor of a purchase money mortgage, in a foreclosure proceeding,
sets off damages resulting from mortgagee's fraudulent representations
concerning the land,5 or where the mortgagee fraudulently induces the
mortgagor to give the notes and mortgage. 6 But the essential requirement
that it "arise out of the same transaction" does not exist in the instant
case.
The statute7 provides a remedy by way of setoff, but it is definitely
limited to claims arising out of a contract s and is never available to set
off tort claims.9 While equity follows the law and permits a setoff wher-
ever it would be permitted if the action was at law, no broader relief is
given under this remedy.'0
By a cross-bill in equity, an equitable setoff may be pleaded where the
claim is germane to the original bill," but that remedy is available only
where some special equity requires such relief. 12 The instant case pre-
sents no such special equity as would justify a court of equity in allowing
the setoff.
Section 38 of our code clearly authorizes the counterclaim in the in-
stant case. The only limitation mentioned in that section is that the de-
fendant's claim be a cause of action in itself. 13 It need not arise out of
the same transaction but may be wholly unrelated. 14 It need not be ger-
mane to the plaintiff's action but may be, as suggested by one writer, a
setoff of damages for a tort against a suit for specific performance of a
contract for the conveyance of land.1
In contrast, the New York courts have placed a more restrictive con-
struction on the counterclaim provision 16 of their practice code. While
3 IM. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 95, § 17.
4 Keegan v. Kinnare, 123 Ill. 280, 14 N.E. 14 (1887); Burns v. Clark, 200 Ill.
App. 277 (1916); Smith v. Gray, 316 Ill. 488, 147 N.E. 459 (1925).
5 Northern Trust Co. v. Sanford, 308 Ill. 381, 139 N.E. 603 (1923).
6 Dunlap v. Peirce, 336 Ill. 178, 168 N.E. 277 (1929).
7 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, § 162.
8 Engstrom v. Olson, 248 Ill. App. 480 (1928); Cox v. Jordan, 86 InI. 560 (1877).
9 Note 8, supra. 10 Smith v. Billings, 62 Ill. App. 77 (1895).
11 Gordon v. Johnson, 186 Ill. 18, 57 N.E. 790 (1900); Rhodes v. Ashurst, 176 Ill.
351, 52 N.E. 118 (1898); Derby v. Gage, 38 Ill. 27 (1865).
12 Citizen's Trust and Savings Bank v. Blair, 259 Ill. App. 294 (1930).
13 Hinton, Illinois Civil Practice Act, p. 138.
14 McCaskill, Illinois Civil Practice Act Annotated (1936), p. 90.
15 Hinton, Illinois Civil Practice Act, p. 141.
16 New York Civil Practice Act, § 266: "A counterclaim may be any cause of
action in favor of the defendants or some of them against the plaintiffs or some
of them, a person whom a plaintiff represents or a plaintiff and another person
or persons alleged to be liable."
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their decisions admit that the counterclaim is more than a setoff or re-
coupment and includes both,17 and while they suggest that it should be
liberally construed to avoid multiplicity of suits,' 8 they have limited the
right to use the counterclaim to claims arising out of,
19 or relevant to, 20
the same transaction, which, in addition, tend to diminish or defeat plain-
tiff's recovery. 21 So, as far as foreclosure suits are concerned, the mort-
gagor's counterclaims are limited to claims such as damages for fraud
arising out of the note or mortgage transaction, 22 or damages for breach
of covenant in the case of purchase money mortgages2 3 and then only
when a deficiency decree is sought.
24
Obviously the conservative construction of the New York code was for
the purpose of preventing the joining of such unrelated actions and count-
erclaims as might arise under our more liberally construed code. The
authors of the Illinois Civil Practice Act recognized, however, that the
counterbalancing of unrelated claims may at times be highly inconven-
ient, and sought to prevent any such impractical uses or abuses by provid-
ing that its use shall be subject to regulation by Supreme Court rules,25
and by authorizing the courts, in their discretion, to order separate trials
of such actions and counterclaims.28  W. H. MAYNOR
NEW TRIAL-STATEMENT OF GROuNDS IN GENERAI,---EFFECT OF FAILuRE TO
PRESENT MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL IN Wmmrwc.-In the case of Doellefield v.
Travelers Insurance Company,' the Appellate Court of the 2nd District of
Illinois was called upon to interpret Section 68 of the Illinois Civil Prac-
tice Act 2 for the first time. On appeal by the plaintiff from an adverse
judgment, the defendant contended that, as no written motion for a new
trial, setting forth the grounds for new trial as provided in Section 68, had
been made, any errors made by the trial court were not preserved for re-
view. The Appellate Court held that inasmuch as the language of that sec-
tion was identical with the provision for moving for a new trial under the
former practice3 it should be interpreted in the same manner as hereto-
17 Keon v. Saxton & Co., 257 N.Y. 412, 178 N.E. 679 (1931).
18 Zysman v. 147 and 149 West 57th Street Corp., 223 N.Y.S. 62 (1927).
19 Merry Realty Co., Inc. v. Shamokin & Hollis R.E. Co., Inc., 174 N.Y.S. 627
(1919); Landes v. Landes, 277 N.Y.S. 886 (1935).
20 Comerford v. Sands, 199 N.Y.S. 2 (1923); Terzi v. Savini, 206 N.Y.S. 967 (1924).
21 Landes v. Landes, 277 N.Y.S. 886 (1935).
22 Hall v. Grays, 238 N.Y.S. 67 (1929).
23 Merritt v. Gouley, 12 N.Y.S. 132 (1890).
24 Citizens Say. Bk. v. 104 East 113 Street Corp., 285 N.Y.S. 271 (1936); Bogert
v. Riordan, 245 N.Y.S. 140 (1930); Fout v. Wolfe, 245 N.Y.S. 505 (1930).
25 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, § 162. 26 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, § 168.
1 24 N.E. (2d) 904 (Ill. App., 1940). 2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, § 192.
s Ii. Rev. Stat. 1931, Ch. 110, § 77: "If either party may wish to except to the
verdict, or for other causes, to move for a new trial .. .he shall, before final
judgment be entered, or during the term it is entered, by himself or counsel, file
the points in writing, particularly specifying the grounds of such motion .... .
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, § 192: "If either party may wish to move for a new
trial . . . he shall, before final judgment be entered, or within 10 days thereafter,
or within such time as the court may allow on motion made within such 10 days,
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fore. In People v. Cohen,4 the Supreme Court had held, under the for-
mer practice, that the requirement for a written motion was directory
and not mandatory.5
In view of this decision, it seems clear that the failure to present a
written motion for a new trial under the code will not be fatal on review,
and the party may avail himself of any cause for a new trial that may
appear on the record, 6 whether it be the admission or rejection of evi-
dence, the giving or refusing of instructions, the lack of sufficient evi-
dence or any other error occurring on the trial, if in addition, the require-
ments of Section 68 are waived by the failure of counsel or the court to
present an objection. However, if the motion is presented in writing and
certain grounds are specified to justify the request, the party filing such
written motion will be deemed to have waived all causes for a new trial
not set forth in his written grounds. G. R. KEEN
PLEADiIG--NECESSITY OF ALLEGING AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES IN ANswER-
APPLICATION OF SEcTIoN 43(4) OF THE ILLINOIS CIVMI PRACTICE ACT.-In the re-
cent case of Parker v. Dameika,1 the Illinois Supreme Court had occasion
to interpret Section 43(4) of the Civil Practice Act.2 The plaintiff sued to
secure specific performance of an option contract for the transfer of two
specific tracts of land. The defendants filed an answer alleging fraud as a
defense but failed to prove the same. The lower court, over objection, per-
mitted introduction by the defendants of evidence that they had entered
into the option contract through ignorance and mistake, although there
were no specific facts set forth nor reference to that defense in the ans-
wer. On appeal from a decree denying such specific performance on the
ground that the option contract was not "entered into understandingly,"
the Supreme Court reversed the decree, holding that the lower court had
erred in permitting the defendants to avail themselves of such defense
without pleading the same as an affirmative defense as required by sec-
tion 43(4) of the Illinois Civil Practice Act.
The problem of the manner of pleading ignorance, mistake, and mat-
ters closely related thereto has had a gradual and two-fold development
by himself or counsel, file the points in writing, particularly specifying the grounds
of such motion . .. ."
4 352 Ill. 380, 185 N.E. 608, 88 A.L.R. 481 (1933). See also Yarber v. Chicago &
Alton Railway Co., 235 Ill. 589, 85 N.E. 928 (1908); Anderson v. Karstens, 297 Ill.
76, 130 N.E. 338 (1921); Bromley v. People, 150 Ill. 297, 37 N.E. 209 (1894).
5 People v. Cohen, 352 Ill. 380, 185 N.E. 608, 88 A.L.R. 481 (1933): "This court
has held that that section [il. Rev. Stat. 1931, Ch. 110, § 77] is directory and not
mandatory, and that, if the party moving for a new trial makes either a written
or verbal motion for a new trial without stating in writing the grounds therefor,
and without objection, the requirement of the statute is waived."
6 Anderson v. Karstens, 297 Ill. 76, 130 N.E. 338 (1921).
1 372 Ill. 235, 23 N.E. (2d) 52 (1939).
2 "The facts constituting any affirmative defense, such as ... that an instru-
ment or transaction is either void or voidable in point of law, as . . .any ground
or defense, whether affirmative or not, which if not expressly stated in the plead-
ing, would be likely to take the opposite party by surprise, must be plainly set
forth in the answer or reply." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, § 167.
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now apparently culminating in the present view requiring the specific
pleading of such matters, so as to give adequate notice thereof to the op-
posite party, whether the form of action be legal or equitable. The former
practice in equity cases may be separated into two divisions: (1) where
the matter was used purely defensively so as to defeat the cause of action
brought,3 and (2) where it was used both defensively and as a basis for
securing affirmative relief for the defendant. In the former, the matter
was properly incorporated in the answer of the defendant, though the
facts relied on had to clearly appear therein. 4 In the latter, it was soon
determined that a mere defensive answer was insufficient,5 and hence the
use of both the answer and cross-bill became necessary to secure such af-
firmative relief. 6 To prevent unnecessary pleading, there was also devel-
oped the subordinate rule that a cross-bill was improper and superfluous
when the rights of the defendant could be adequately protected by the
court on the hearing of the original billj These standards of the old equity
practice, with the insistence on informative pleadings, have been definite-
ly carried over into the present practice in Illinois today by the instant
case.
Some difficulty is presented when the problem arises in an action as at
law. In ancient common law days the defensive practice involved the use
of the specific traverse, which required the pleader to single out and deny
but one of the facts alleged in the declaration, from which practice de-
veloped the idea that the purpose of pleading was that of issue-formula-
tion. Thus, in assumpsit it was usual to traverse in particular the existence
of the contract itself, the consideration for the contract, or the plaintiff's
performance of any conditions precedent or the breach thereof.8 Consid-
3 Gronowski v. Jozefowicz, 291 11. 266, 126 N.E. 108 (1920).
4 Even in the early chancery practice the pleadings had to be informative in
nature, rather than issue-formulating, as was the common law theory. As a con-
sequence before a party could take advantage of any defense, such defense had
to be specifically and clearly pleaded. See Jewett v. Sweet, 178 Ill. 96, 52 N.E.
962 (1899); Dorn v. Geuder, 171 Ill. 362, 49 N.E. 492 (1898); Linder v. Barnett, 318
Ill. 259, 149 N.E. 239 (1925); Mitchell v. Clem, 295 ill. 150, 128 N.E. 815 (1920).
5 Tarleton v. Vietes, 1 Gilm. (Ill.) 470 (1844); Edwards v. Helm, 4 Scam.
(Ill.) 143 (1842).
6 Thus it was necessary that a cross-bill be filed to establish an agreement or
conveyance which the original bill seeks to set aside, Carnochan & Mitchel v.
Christie, 11 Wheat. (U. S.) 446, 6 L. Ed. 516 (1826); or to compel the cancellation or
surrender of a contract which the original bill seeks to specifically enforce,
Jones v. Smith, 14 Ill. 229 (1852); Hurd v. Case, 32 Ill. 45 (1863); or on a bill to
foreclose a mortgage, to compel the complainant to litigate an adverse title,
Parlin & Orendorff Co. v. Galloway, 95 Ill. App. 60 (1901). For a further discussion
of the function and requirements of the equitable cross-bill, see Puterbaugh.
Chancery Pleading and Practice (7th ed., 1930), I, p. 549 et seq.
7 Akin v. Cassiday, 105 Ill. 22 (1882), wherein it was held that a decree of the
court declaring a mortgage void would accomplish the same result as that asked
in the cross-bill, declaring to have the mortgage and notes cancelled.
8 Chitty, Pleading, I, p. 473 et seq. At this stage, the defendant who had placed
his agreement in writing could scarcely deny its existence, even though mis-
takenly made; hence he was obligated to file a separate suit in equity to secure
its cancellation before having any defense to the suit at law.
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erations of convenience however prompted a modification of the pristine
stringency of this rule, with the result that the defendant was at first per-
mitted, and afterwards required, to plead, not to any single averment of
the declaration but to the plaintiff's case as a whole, using a plea known as
the general issue for this purpose. 9 As a direct result, the issues formed in
any given case included every element of the plaintiff's cause of action,
and he was therefore poorly informed as to the defenses he might have
had to meet.' 0
Becoming increasingly aware of the hardships which had arisen by
such unwarranted extension of the general issue, the courts of England
promulgated the Hilary Rules," the principal purpose of which was to
limit the scope of the general issue and to compel the defendant either to
deny particular parts of the declaration or to plead specially every matter
of defense not actually involved in a traverse. Thus Chitty says, "In
every species of assumpsit, all matters in confession and avoidance, .. .
including not only those by way of discharge, but those which show the
transaction to be either void or voidable in point of law, on the ground of
fraud ...or otherwise, shall be specially pleaded."' 2 This step not only
restored the original nature of the specific traverse but also tended to
make common law pleading informative as well as issue-forming. Such
was the state of the law at the time of the adoption of the code procedure in
the various states.
The code ideal was, of course, to make pleading into a device to in-
form the parties and the court as to the cause of action relied on and the
defenses thereto, rather than to simplify and isolate the issues. As a con-
sequence, the enacted codes usually provided that the defendant's answer
should contain a statement of any new matter in ordinary and concise
language, the answer by way of denial usually being limited to cases
where a specific traverse would have been proper in the later common
9 Chitty, Pleading, I, p. 476 et seq; Puterbaugh, Common Law Pleading and
Practice (10th Ed., Jones, 1926), I, p. 238 et seq.
10 As the use of the general issue became more prevalent, the courts per-
mitted anomalous extensions of this peculiar form of traverse. It became the
established practice to admit under the general issue defenses which were not,
as in the original usage, merely negative of the plaintiff's case, but matters
properly pleaded by way of confession and avoidance, such as infancy, release,
accord and satisfaction, and former recovery. Among the very few exceptions
to this rule was the defense of the statute of limitations and discharge in bank-
ruptcy, both of which required special pleading and were not provable under
the general issue. See Benes v. Bankers' Life Insurance Co., 282 Ill. 236, 118
N.E. 443 (1918).
11 Chitty, Pleading, I, p. 733 and p. 738 et seq. For a discussion of the general
effect and application of the rules, see W. S. Holdsworth, "The New Rules of the
Hilary Term," 1 Cambridge Law Journal 261.
12 Chitty, Pleading, I, p. 517. Some examples included by the author which
required special pleading are as follows: Infancy, coverture, release, payment,
performance, want of consideration, illegality of consideration, drawing, endors-
ing, and accepting bills and notes by way of accommodation, mutual credit, un-
seaworthiness, misrepresentation, concealment and deviation. An example
showing the application of the rule may be found in Hayselden v. Staff, 5 Ad. & E.
153, 111 Eng. Rep. 1124 (1836).
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law system.'3 The problem became a little complicated, however, by the
other code provisions which purported to abolish the distinctions between
actions of law and also between law and equity. 14 In some states, the
courts have construed such provisions as producing an actual consolida-
tion, while others have treated the blending as not complete, retaining ba-
sically the older rules in the various forms of actions. New York, typical
of the first group, has adopted the view that the change has given the de-
fendant the right to interpose his defense in any case, whether originally
legal or equitable, even though formerly resort to a court of equity would
have been necessary. Thus the New York Court early held that the de-
fendant was allowed to show mistake in a deed given by the plaintiff's
grantors to defendant's landlord as a defense without the use of a counter-
claim.15 This practice was contrary to the older chancery practice which
has required the prayer for reformation or rescission of the contract to be
set up in a cross-bill or made the basis of a separate suit in equity. In con-
trast is the view of the other group of states, illustrated by Lombard v.
Cowham,'6 in which a Wisconsin court held that an equitable right to es-
tablish and enforce a constructive trust would be denied efficacy as a de-
fense to a legal action until the existence of the trust had been established
in a separate equitable action or had been introduced by a counter-claim
fashioned along the lines of an old cross-bill in equity. Similarly, in Gunn
v. Madigan17 mistake such as would give an equitable right to reforma-
tion was treated as still being an equitable cross-action and therefore
pleadable and triable as such. Illinois seems to be aligned with this latter
group.'8
What the status of the law in Illinois today would be in regard to plead-
ing mistake as a legal or equitable defense is a matter of some conjec-
ture. The modern thought is that the purpose of pleading is informational
as well as issue formulating, as is evidenced by Section 40 of the Illinois
Civil Practice Act,19 especially clause 1 which abolishes the use of the
general issue and replaces it with specific admissions or denials, and
clause 3 which states that a denial must not be evasive. This trend is fur-
ther evidenced by section 43 of the Civil Practice Act,20 particularly
13 New York Code of Procedure of 1849, § 149, Clause 2. See also McKyring v.
Bull, 16 N. Y. 297 (1857).
14 N. Y. Laws 1848, Ch. 379, § 62, amplified in Illinois by Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939,
Ch. 110, § 155.
15 Crary v. Goodman, 12 N. Y. 266 (1855). See also Susquehanna Steamship Co.
v. A. 0. Andersen Co., 239 N. Y. 285, 146 N.E. 381 (1925), in which case it was
held that facts entitling a defendant to reformation of an instrument could be
pleaded as a defense to an action at law and no counterclaim for reformation
was needed. In each case, however, the facts regarding the mistake affirmatively
appeared in the defendant's answer.
16 34 Wis. 486 (1874).
17 28 Wis. 158 (1871). For a comprehensive discussion of the problem see
Hinton, "Equitable Defenses Under Modern Codes," 18 Mich. L. Rev. 717; Cook,
"Equitable Defenses," 32 Yale L. J. 645.
18 See Hinton, "Pleading Under the Illinois Civil Practice Act," 1 U. of Chi. L.
Rev. 591; note, 11 Corn. L. Q. 396.
19 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, § 164. 2o fli. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, § 167.
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clause 4, which in essence requires that every affirmative defense be
specifically pleaded and set forth in the answer or reply. The phraseology
of the section is broad and even requires the special pleading of defenses
which were technically not affirmative defenses under the earlier sys-
tems. If there is any doubt as to the right of a defendant to offer a "sur-
prise" defense which could have been properly raised under a denial be-
fore the code, it has been removed by the "catch all" part of clause 4 re-
quiring specific pleading of any defense, whether affirmative or not,
which, if not expressly stated in the pleading, would be likely to surprise
the opposite party. It can be seen, therefore, that the procedure to be fol-
lowed in Illinois, regarding the pleading of such defenses as mistake, can
be predicted with comparative certainty. Firstly, in all actions intrinsi-
cally legal in nature, it is necessary that affirmative pleading rather than
the general denial be used in the answer, as the defense would tend to
surprise the opposite party. If affirmative relief is also sought in such ac-
tion, an equitable counter-claim is necessary. If the action is brought as
an equitable one, then the defendant should proceed as before by using
an affirmative answer whenever the matter relied on is purely defensive
in nature, pleading each such defense with certainty and clarity, whether
affirmative or not, so as not to surprise. If, on the other hand, affirmative
relief is required such as the cancellation of a note or the declaration of
a trust, the pleader should again use a counter-claim, the code equivalent
of the former cross-bill in equity. I. BIRNBAUM
